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Federalist No. 39

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay

❶This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections.

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Federalist No. 39
Analysis of Federalist #51

The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the present Congress and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States.

Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves.

The duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard and to the model of State constitutions. The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective for the period of six years, which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia.

The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no explicit provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate.

And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office.

The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.

Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.

They ought with equal care to have preserved the federal form, which regards the Union as a Confederacy of sovereign states; instead of which they have framed a national government, which regards the Union as a consolidation of the States. The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision.

Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State-the authority of the people themselves.

The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution will not be a national but a federal act. That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors — the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation — is obvious from this single consideration: It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves.

Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States.

Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal and not a national constitution. The next relation is to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived.

The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion and on the same principle as they are in the legislature of a particular State.

So far the government is national , not federal. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is federal , not national. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters.

The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic.

From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features. The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the operation of the government is by the adversaries of the plan of the convention is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation in their individual capacities.

On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the national not the federal character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only.

But the operation of the government on the people in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, will, in the sense of its opponents, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a national government.

But if the government be national with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government.

Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures.

Constrain to simple back and forward steps. Copy code to clipboard. Add a personal note: Houston, we have a problem! Stand out and be remembered with Prezi, the secret weapon of great presenters. Send the link below via email or IM Copy.

Present to your audience Start remote presentation. Do you really want to delete this prezi? Neither you, nor the coeditors you shared it with will be able to recover it again. Comments 0 Please log in to add your comment. Transcript of Federalist No. Representatives are the admins of the government Federalist No. Should the form of government be strictly republican? Power to govern must be consented by the people.

Works Cited Madison, James. Constitution Society, 18 Oct. The Framers believed in having a republican government because it meshed well with the ingenuity of the American people. James Madison, however, was not exactly sure what a republic consisted of.

A republic, by definition, has to do with a form of government in which its power comes from the people and elected people from office. Controversy over this type of government spread as the states felt they were not given enough power. Ultimately, this essay goes on to explain how Madison and others created a free government where the majority of people were satisfied as national and federal government saw a balance of powers.

What makes up a "republic? The House of Representatives, Senate, Judges, and the President are all appointed by the people and their terms equally served.

Supporters of a federal government simply see the government as a union of multiple sovereign states; a national government is a total consolidation of the states. This "mixed character" of the government is a compromise between those who are split between the two kinds of government. The foundation of the Constitution, for example, is a federal act, as it requires the unanimous decision of all the separate, sovereign states. The Senate is one part of Congress.

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The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full.

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The Federalist Papers () The Founding Fathers. Table of Contents Summary. Context. Important Terms, People and Events Context. Important Terms, People and Events. Timeline. Summary and Analysis. Federalist Essays No.1 - No Federalist Essays No.6 - No Federalist Essays No - No Federalist Essays No - No Federalist.

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The Federalist Papers Summary No Madison January 16, Madison begins the “candid survey of the plan of government reported by the Convention” by defining a republican form of government and then answering critics concerning whether the proposed plan is federal or national, that is, a confederacy of States or a consolidation . Summary This section of four chapters deals with a wide miscellany of subjects, some of which are touched on only briefly. In Chapter 37, it was a sad commentar.

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Federalist 39 was written for the Independent Journal, a New York newspaper, on January 16, by James Madison. In this essay Madison starts by defining and describing a republican government. In this essay Madison starts by defining and describing a republican government. What exactly is federal vs. national? Federalist No. 39 Tahlor Mills, Steven Ngo, Korbett O'Banion, Thao Nguyen FEDERALIST PEOPLE ESSAYS GOVERNMENT.